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Abstract
Whether it be rigging interest rates for profit gain or
contributing to anti-competition schemes, our world is plagued by
financial scandal. Today, more and more collusive schemes are
being conducted abroad, leaving American authorities with the
heavy task of navigating complex cross-border probes. Finding
evidence that corroborates fraudsters’ criminal acts is hard enough
within U.S. borders. To do the same in foreign territory calls for
added considerations. What’s standing in the way? Try: the United
States Constitution. This Comment highlights the 2017 case of
United States v. Allen, which held that the Fifth Amendment
prohibits use of compelled testimony in criminal proceedings, even
when a foreign sovereign compels testimony in accordance with
foreign law. This Comment proceeds by outlining the arguments
presented on appeal, and concludes by proposing prosecutorial
strategies to adopt for purposes of avoiding foreign-compelled
testimony and cross-border issues of taint.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Everything is rigged,” is how a Rolling Stone edition portrayed
global financial corruption.1 In 2008, New York federal officials
began unraveling pieces of one of Wall Street’s costliest scandals. 2
However, authorities soon learned that it was not just America’s
financial system that had been affected—it was the world’s. The
manipulation of a benchmark lending rate known as “LIBOR”3 has
shaken the U.S., the EU, and the UK in such a big way that it has
called for considerable reform.4 In addition, governmental
authorities have come face-to-face with the complex challenges tied
to trying cross-border corporate crime in the U.S. 5 One recent
example involves the prosecution of two UK-based employees who
contributed to the international LIBOR scheme.
LIBOR represents a figure that banks use to set interest rates.6
The rate is so significant that any manipulation of it could “affect a
pile of assets about 100 times the size of the United States federal
budget.”7 Over the last several years, derivatives traders have
convinced bank employees to manipulate LIBOR rates to benefit
traders’ financial positions.8 One trader from Royal Bank of
Scotland, for example, incentivized a LIBOR submitter to
manipulate interest rates in exchange for the trader’s lunch. 9
1. See Matt Taibbi, Everything is Rigged: The Biggest Price-Fixing Scandal
Ever, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 25, 2013), www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/
everything-is-rigged-the-biggest-financial-scandal-yet-20130425
(featuring
price-fixing corruption at “name-brand too-big-to-fail banks”. The article dubs
the Illuminati “amateurs” compared to those involved in the global financial
scam. According to MIT Professor Andrew Lo, what is now infamously known
as the LIBOR scandal “[dwarfed] by orders of magnitude any financial scam in
the history of markets”).
2. Tracking the Libor Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016),
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/23/business/dealbook/db-libortimeline.html#/#time370_10900.
3. “LIBOR” stands for the London Interbank Offered Rate.
4. See James McBride et al., Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 12, 2016), www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-liborscandal.
5. See infra Section II (explaining the evidentiary and constitutional
challenges that the Department of Justice faced throughout the prosecution of
two individuals whose collusive acts occurred abroad).
6. Mcbride et al., supra note 4. “LIBOR is a benchmark interest rate based
on the rates at which banks lend unsecured funds to each other on the London
interbank market.” Id. This article also comments on the global effect that
manipulating the rate has had on financial markets.
7. Taibbi, supra note 1. Taibbi highlights that the LIBOR scheme has led to
a manipulation of $500 trillion plus in financial tools.
8. McBride et al., supra note 4.
9. See Taibbi, supra note 1 (recounting how a trader who worked for
Barclays had “monkeyed with Libor submissions in exchange for a bottle of
Bollinger champagne,” and explaining that at times, it was even more pathetic
than that. For instance, a Swiss franc trader asked a Libor submitter to adjust
the rate to a certain number. When the Libor submitter asked what the change
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Today’s unfortunate reality consists of rigging interest rates “in
exchange for day-old sushi.”10 It is hard to envision “an image that
better captures the moral insanity of the modern financial-services
sector.”11
Though from a legal perspective, what is just as unfortunate
are the prosecutorial shortcomings that government agencies face
when securing criminal convictions for financial schemers like
these.
In 2017, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
criminal convictions of two foreign nationals who allegedly
contributed to the LIBOR scheme.12 A key basis for the Second
Circuit’s reversal involved the Government’s inability to prove that
testimony compelled by a foreign sovereign had not materially been
used against the defendants in the case.13 The constitutional issues
tested new limits of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination
Clause in a cross-border context.
Regardless of one’s agreement with its application to modern
fact patterns,14 the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause
(the “Clause”) is and will always be a “fundamental . . . part of our
constitutional fabric.”15 At its very core, the Clause protects
individuals from being compelled to testify against themselves.16 A
more complicated inquiry involves determining what protection
results when a foreign sovereign lawfully compels an individual to
testify, and a prosecutor subsequently uses that testimony against
the same individual in an American court.17 The Second Circuit
provided its answer to this exact hypothetical when it held that the
Fifth Amendment prohibits use of compelled testimony in criminal
proceedings, even when a foreign sovereign compels testimony in
accordance with foreign law.18
United States v. Allen concerns parallel investigations between
the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) and the
United States’ Department of Justice (“DOJ”) into foreign nationals
whose alleged misconduct affected the financial markets of multiple
countries.19 What may sound like a unique probe was, however, just

was worth, the trader replied, “I’ve got some sushi rolls from yesterday”).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017).
13. Id. at 101.
14. See Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause
Explained and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 245
(2004) (citing the inconsistency in the way the Self-Incrimination Clause has
been interpreted by the law, lawyers, and academia alike).
15. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5
(1964), abrogated by United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See infra Sections III-IV.
18. Allen, 864 F.3d at 68, 82 (emphasis added).
19. See id. at 71-72, 76-78.
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another among a laundry list of complex cross-border investigations
into corporate crime.20 Indeed, enforcement agencies have seen a
rise in collusive international acts by individuals like those involved
in the LIBOR scheme.21 In response, the DOJ has launched
investigations in various countries, at times in tandem with those
countries’
investigatory
agencies.22
Unfortunately,
these
investigations are often complicated by the fact that incriminating
individuals who work for large financial institutions requires
sorting through “an avalanche of records,” and perhaps most
importantly, finding a key witness to corroborate that those paper
records reveal criminal business activity.23
Acting Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Blanco
previously admitted that, “[p]iercing the corporate veil . . . requires
. . . [undertaking] a time-consuming and resource-intensive
process.”24 At the same time, government agencies must remain
compliant with foreign law—quite the hurdle to overcome when the
majority of a long and convoluted investigation is conducted abroad,
and the case is subsequently adjudicated before an American
court.25 Needless to say, U.S. prosecutors are required to keep
20. See, e.g., Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. Kenneth A. Blanco, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Remarks at the American Bar Association National Institute on White
Collar Crime (Mar. 10, 2017) (transcript available at www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-kenneth-blanco-speaks-americanbar-association-national) (discussing multi-jurisdictional investigations and
prosecutions by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal Division).
21. See Susan E. Brune & Erin C. Dougherty, Representing Individuals in
International Investigations, 40 THE CHAMPION 38, 43 (Sept./Oct. 2016)
www.brunelaw.com/publications/2016-10-20-representing-individuals-ininternational-investigations/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Brune_
Representing_Individuals_Sept-Oct_2016.pdf (discussing, in particular,
international investigations the DOJ has focused on in the context of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and concluding that “[i]nternational
investigations promise to become more and more common”); see also Blanco,
supra note 20 (acknowledging that “[i]t is clear . . . global investigations of
corruption are on the rise . . . [i]t is no longer just us and a few other countries”).
22. See Assistant Att’y Gen. Leslie R. Caldwell, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks at American Bar Association’s 30th Annual National Institute on
White Collar Crime (Mar. 4, 2016) (transcript available at
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwellspeaks-american-bar-association-s-30th).
23. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Libor and London Whale Cases Show Hurdles
with Foreign Defendants, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/
07/24/business/dealbook/fraud-prosecution-libor-london-whale-cases.html
(explaining that international white collar criminal investigations are so-called
“paper” cases, which require witnesses to solidify that what otherwise looks like
everyday corporate acts are in fact criminal).
24. Blanco, supra note 20.
25. See generally Stuart Alford QC et al., Second Circuit: Fifth Amendment
Bars Testimony Compelled by Foreign Governments, 2188 LATHAM & WATKINS
WHITE COLLAR CRIM. DEF. & INVESTIGATIONS PRAC. 1, 4 (July 31, 2017),
m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/second-circuit-fifth-amendment-bars-testimonycompelled-by-foreign-governments (highlighting the attendant risks involved
when investigating suspects alongside foreign agencies, and commenting on the
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significant considerations in mind, including determining whether
their prosecutorial actions will violate a defendant’s right against
self-incrimination.26 These considerations translate into a
heightened need for coordination among U.S. and foreign
agencies.27 Though in reality, even U.S. prosecutors who do their
best to work collaboratively with foreign counterparts fall prey to a
minefield of constitutional issues that have the potential to
obliterate otherwise successful criminal convictions. 28
Ultimately, Allen reaffirms the need to institute higher levels
of precaution when prosecuting individuals who have previously
given foreign-compelled testimony.29 This Comment first seeks to
dissect the unique Fifth Amendment issue presented in this case.
Second, this Comment will weigh the constitutional arguments
presented on appeal, while taking into consideration how the
Second Circuit’s ruling will affect future U.S. prosecutors facing
similar evidentiary and constitutional issues. Last, this Comment
will propose proactive prosecutorial tactics to take after conducting
investigations alongside foreign agencies. The goal of this proposal
is to help prosecutors navigate complex Fifth Amendment concerns
in the international white collar criminal context.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Manipulation of LIBOR and the Resulting
Parallel Investigation
In 2012, the DOJ and FCA began investigating individuals
involved in the manipulation of LIBOR.30 LIBOR, also known as
steps the DOJ must take in cross-border cases to avoid certain procedural and
constitutional issues).
26. Brune & Dougherty, supra note 21, at 39.
27. See, e.g., Assistant Att’y Gen. Leslie R. Caldwell, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks at American Bar Association’s 30th Annual National Institute on
White Collar Crime (Mar. 4, 2016) (transcript available at www.justice.gov/
opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-speaks-american-barassociation-s-30th) (emphasizing that “[c]ollaboration is especially important
when it comes to threats posed by international corruption”).
28. See Bob Van Voris et al., Libor Traders’ Appeal Win Could Chill U.S.
Cross-Border Cases, BLOOMBERG (July 19, 2017, 3:24 PM),
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-19/ex-rabobank-traders-liborrigging-conviction-tossed-on-appeal (providing the following commentary
from an attorney who represented a Barclays LIBOR trader: “[t]his ruling
highlights the dangers of cross-border investigations and prosecutions
where protections afforded by one country are not necessarily respected in
a different jurisdiction”).
29. Alford QC et al., supra note 25.
30. See, e.g., McBride et al., supra note 4 (explaining the international
LIBOR investigation that began in 2012 to uncover the global “plot by multiple
banks – notably Deutsche Bank, Barclays, UBS, Rabobank, and the Royal Bank
of Scotland – to manipulate these interest rates for profit sharing” dating back
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“the world’s most important number,”31 is used by global financial
markets as a reference rate.32 In effect, LIBOR determines a range
of financial instruments amounting to at least $450 trillion. 33
Everything from futures, options, swaps, student loans, credit
cards, and mortgages that are traded via global exchanges
incorporate the benchmark rate into their financial terms. 34 The
figure is set by individuals who work for large, well-known banks
abroad.35 LIBOR is then integrated into the global “interest rate
swap.”36
Prior to LIBOR’s manipulation, British Banker’s Association
(“BBA”) established a panel of banks to administer LIBOR rates for
certain foreign currencies.37 One panel that BBA established was
Rabobank, which was tasked with administering the LIBOR rates
for the U.S. dollar and Japanese Yen. 38 Anthony Allen (“Allen”), a
U.K. national and cash trader, worked at Rabobank at the time of
the alleged manipulation.39 As Head of Liquidity, Allen was
responsible for overseeing USD LIBOR rates, along with cash
traders Anthony Conti (“Conti”) and Paul Robson (“Robson”). 40
Robson was responsible for submitting LIBOR rates for Japanese
Yen while Conti was responsible for submitting LIBOR rates for
USD.41 Derivatives traders who worked at Rabobank with Robson
and Conti often asked them to submit rates that were either higher
or lower than the number Conti and Robson initially planned to
submit.42 The LIBOR submissions were purportedly changed to
benefit the bank along with the positions of the derivatives
traders.43
By 2013, word of the financial scheme by individuals at
Rabobank and other institutions had spread, and enforcement
agencies from the DOJ and FCA began investigating Allen and
to 2003).
31. See Allen, 864 F.3d at 69.
32. Id.
33. Libor: What is it and Why Does it Matter?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2015),
www.bbc.com/news/business-19199683.
34. See, e.g., Replacing Libor: The Countdown Begins, FORBES (Aug. 16,
2017, 2:23 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/tortoiseinvest/2017/08/16/replacinglibor-the-countdown-begins/#63aca9ed4e2b (indicating that “over $350 trillion
dollars’ worth of financial derivative contracts, mortgages, bonds and retail and
commercial loans have their interest rates tied to LIBOR”).
35. Chad Bray, Convictions of 2 Former Traders in Libor Scandal Are
Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/business/
dealbook/convictions-of-2-former-traders-in-libor-scandal-are-dismissed.html.
36. See Allen, 864 F.3d at 71.
37. Id. at 69-70.
38. Id. at 70.
39. Id. at 72.
40. Id.; see also United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684, 688 (S.D.N.Y.
2016), rev’d, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017).
41. Allen, 864 F.3d at 72.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Conti’s alleged involvement.44 In the U.K., the Financial Services
and Markets Act of 2000 (“FSMA”) allows the FCA to lawfully
compel individuals to testify or face criminal sanction, including
imprisonment.45 These compelled statements can be used as leads
for a case, but cannot be used directly against an individual in a
subsequent proceeding.46 The FCA compelled Allen and Conti to
testify pursuant to their powers under the FSMA.47 Thereafter, the
FCA brought an enforcement action against Robson, the other cash
trader who Allen supervised at Rabobank.48 During that time, the
FCA provided Robson with the evidence against him, 49 including
transcripts of Allen and Conti’s compelled testimony50—testimony
that Robson did in fact review. Eventually, Robson was charged in
the Southern District of New York with wire fraud for rigging JPY
LIBOR rates.51 Months later, Allen and Conti were also charged in
the U.S. with conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud along with
various counts of wire fraud.52

B. The Use of Robson as a Key Witness
After Robson’s guilty verdict, he agreed to cooperate with the
DOJ by revealing information about Rabobank employees who
Robson believed were involved in the scheme. 53 The prosecutors
used the testimony of two other cooperators and eight witnesses, 54

44. See Id. at 76-77 (describing the DOJ’s investigation into the LIBOR
scandal and the subsequent interviews conducted alongside the FCA).
45. Marc P. Berger & Yana Grishkan, Second Circuit Rules Fifth
Amendment Applicable to Statements Provided to Foreign Governments, 49 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. 1224 (BNA) (July 31, 2017); see also Sean Hecker & Karolos
Seeger, The Use of Foreign Compelled Testimony in Cross-Border Investigations
– The Impact of the Second Circuit’s Allen Decision, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: BUSINESS CRIME 2018 at 9, 9 (Global Legal
Group ed., 8th ed. 2017) (discussing Section 177 of the FSMA, which mandates
that failure to testify can result in criminal sanction and discussing Section 174,
which grants direct (but not derivative) use immunity to compelled
interviewees).
46. Henning, supra note 23.
47. Allen, 864 F.3d at 76.
48. Hartley M.K. West et al., Cross-Border Criminal Investigations Just
Became More Complicated, THE RECORDER (Sept. 7, 2017),
www.therecorder.com/id=1202797452004/CrossBorder-CriminalInvestigations-Just-Became-More-Complicated.
49. Id.
50. Allen, 864 F.3d at 77.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 78.
53. See Jodi L. Avergun, US Second Circuit Finds Testimony Compelled by
UK Regulators to be Inadmissible in Criminal Proceedings, NAT’L L. REV. (July
25, 2017), www.natlawreview.com/article/us-second-circuit-finds-testimonycompelled-uk-regulators-to-be-inadmissible (detailing the overall background
of Allen and Robson’s role as a cooperating witness).
54. Allen, 864 F.3d at 78.
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but Robson was the only person who offered the grand jury key
information that led to Allen and Conti’s indictment.55 Specifically,
Robson gave FBI Special Agent Jeffrey Weeks information about
Allen and Conti, which was used at trial. 56 Based on the information
provided by Robson, Agent Weeks relayed to the jury that Allen
requested “LIBOR submitters in London to consider the positions
and the requests of Rabobank traders and adjust their
submissions.”57 Agent Weeks also testified, again relying on what
Robson had told him, that Robson was aware Conti had “considered
his own positions as appropriate reason or justification for setting
the rates” for USD submissions. 58 In effect, the material
information Robson had shared with U.S. authorities led the jury to
find Allen and Conti guilty.59
Defendants’ counsel countered the guilty verdict, arguing that
Robson’s involvement as the DOJ’s corroborating witness tainted
the case.60 A central evidentiary issue hinged on whether the DOJ’s
use of Robson to convict Allen and Conti (collectively, “Defendants”)
was unconstitutional when Robson had previously reviewed the
Defendants’ foreign-compelled statements.61 Robson’s recollection
of Allen and Conti’s roles in the scheme had undoubtedly been
colored by his reading of the compelled testimony, which
subsequently shaped what Robson told the DOJ. 62 Allen and Conti
moved to suppress the evidence derived from Robson’s testimony,
or alternatively, to dismiss their indictment on Kastigar grounds.63
Notably, the fact that the FCA lawfully compelled Allen and Conti
to testify pursuant to a foreign government power later proved to be
impertinent to the constitutional question.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 100.
59. See id. (highlighting that Robson’s corroborating statements to the DOJ
“were not merely material. They were essential . . .”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
60. See Opening Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 109-15, United States
v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-898) [hereinafter Brief for
Defendants].
61. Henning, supra note 23.
62. Id.; see also Allen, 864 F.3d at 68 (explaining that Robson had “closely
reviewed [the compelled] testimony, annotating it and taking several pages of
handwritten notes”).
63. See Marc P. Berger & Justin Florence, Cross-Border Investigations and
the Fifth Amendment, N.Y. L. J. (Nov. 13, 2015, 2:00 AM) www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/almID/1202742296879/CrossBorder-Investigations-andthe-Fifth-Amendment/ (discussing the investigation and explaining the court’s
analysis regarding Allen and Conti’s Kastigar Motion).
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C. The Scope of Immunity in Federal Practice & the
Kastigar Burden
There are several types of immunity that are conferred in
federal practice. Transactional immunity is the most
comprehensive as it provides immunity “for any transaction
relating to the compelled testimony.” 64 By contrast, derivative use
immunity provides immunity from “the actual use of the compelled
testimony and any evidence derived therefrom (fruits of the
compelled testimony) in a prosecution against the immunized
witness.”65 Derivative use may be granted by an informal
agreement or formal order.66
The defense may raise evidentiary use issues in a Motion to
Dismiss either before, during, or after a trial, in which case a
“Kastigar hearing” will be held.67 In Kastigar v. United States, the
Supreme Court upheld 18 U.S.C. § 6002, the use immunity statute,
ruling that the prosecution is barred from derivatively using
immunized testimony.68 “The statute provides a sweeping
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled
testimony and any information derived therefrom”. 69 The statute
also offers defendants a comprehensive Fifth Amendment
guarantee by prohibiting government use of compelled evidence
either as an “investigatory lead” or as a basis for targeting a
witness.70 Significantly, Kastigar holds that the government
maintains a “heavy burden” to establish that the prosecution has
64. GRAND JURY PRAC. § 10.01(2) (Law Journal Press 2018); see also
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (explaining that
transactional immunity “affords considerably broader protection than . . . the
Fifth Amendment privilege”).
65. GRAND JURY PRAC. § 10.01(2) (Law Journal Press 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Allen, 864 F.3d at 67 n.3 (discussing the
distinction between direct and derivative use immunity).
66. GRAND JURY PRAC. § 10.01(1) (Law Journal Press 2018). It is also
important to note that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court’s thorough discussion of
use immunity in Kastigar carefully distinguishes between use immunity and
the broader derivative use immunity . . . the two now almost always arise
together in federal courts; statutory immunity, requiring both use and
derivative use immunity . . . is much more common than informal immunity.”
GRAND JURY PRAC. § 10.07(1) n.1 (Law Journal Press 2018) (citing United
States v. Plummer, 941 F.2d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations
omitted)).
67. David M. Nissman & Ed Hagen, Non-evidentiary Use of Immunized
Testimony—United States v. North, in LAW OF CONFESSIONS § 3:8 (2d ed. 2018)
at 1; see Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 687 (noting that the Second Circuit’s general
practice is to wait to hold Kastigar hearings until after trial).
68. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATTORNEY’S MANUAL: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 718 (1997)
www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-718-derivative-useimmunity.
69. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
70. Id.
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independent knowledge of the facts. 71 Accordingly, evidence used
against the witness must be retrieved from an independent source,
rather than from the witness himself.72
In Allen, after the initial briefing and oral argument was
heard, the lower court determined that a Kastigar hearing was
necessary to decide whether the evidence presented was tainted. 73
The district court denied the presence of any Kastigar issues,
finding that the DOJ sufficiently proved its evidence was derived
from Robson’s personal knowledge and experiences.74 The court was
satisfied that the evidence presented was independently derived
after concluding that there was no overlap between Allen and
Conti’s foreign-compelled testimony and material portions of
Robson’s trial testimony.75 Judge José A. Cabranes, writing for the
appellate court felt quite the opposite. The resulting opinion has
sparked a constitutional debate regarding the use of lawfully
compelled testimony abroad, and the subsequent right to remain
silent in American proceedings.76

D. Allen’s Absolute Ban on Foreign-Compelled
Testimony
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmatively held that
the Fifth Amendment prohibits use of involuntary testimony given
under legal compulsion by a foreign power.77 To enumerate, Allen
provides three key holdings: (i) the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
use of foreign-compelled testimony against an individual in an
American court; (ii) the DOJ failed to prove that Robson’s
recollection of the facts were significantly “different, and less
incriminating, than the testimony” ultimately proffered; and, (iii)
Allen and Conti’s convictions could not be affirmed based on the
DOJ’s use of, and reliance upon, tainted testimony.78 The Second
71. Nissman & Hagen, supra note 67, at 1 (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at
461, but explaining that some courts, including the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
circuits view the burden as one of preponderance of the evidence); see also
Nissman & Hagen, supra note 67, at 3 n.1 (citing U.S. v. Overmyer, 899 F.2d
457 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990); U.S. v. Williams, 817 F.2d
1136, 1138 (5th Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Hampton, 775 F.2d 1479, 1485 (11th Cir.
1985); and U.S. v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th Cir. 1985)).
72. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460 (holding that defendants who raise claims
under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 and who prove that they have previously been granted
immunity will properly shift the “heavy burden” of proof to the government to
establish that evidence was obtained from an independent source).
73. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 687.
74. Id. at 697; Allen, 864 F.3d at 79.
75. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 698.
76. See Van Voris et al., supra note 28 (suggesting that Allen is a significant
setback that could undermine the feasibility of prosecuting cross-border
corporate crime).
77. Allen, 864 F.3d at 101.
78. Id.
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Circuit also affirmed the government’s heavy burden of proof under
Kastigar after following the D.C. Circuit’s approach to reviewing
testimony for taint.79 While doing so, Allen incidentally offered
suggestions as to what future prosecutors should do to overcome
suspicion of taint in the presence of foreign-compelled disclosures.
Allen maintains that the significance of the timing of the Fifth
Amendment violation supports why the origin of compulsion is
irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. 80 The opinion reiterated
that the right against self-incrimination is not abused when an
individual is forced to speak, but rather when the individual’s
compulsory statements are used to incriminate—regardless of
whether testimony was compelled by a foreign power.81 In effect,
Allen significantly blurred the lines between domestic and foreigncompelled testimony, finding that the Self-Incrimination Clause
protects against the use of compelled statements - period.82
Accordingly, affording individuals an absolute trial right against
self-incrimination means that even when a defendant secures
immunity by a foreign sovereign not bound by the Fifth
Amendment, the defendant’s previously immunized statements
shall also be treated as such in U.S. proceedings.83 In support of this
proposition, Allen touched on the distinct purposes of the Fourth
Amendment’s deterrent search and seizure right and the Fifth
Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.84
By comparison, Miranda rights apply internationally when
American authorities are involved; the same is not true of the Fifth
Amendment.85 A defendant’s Fifth Amendment right is triggered
inside a U.S. courtroom if, and when, compelled testimony is used. 86
To put it differently, the exclusionary rule travels with officers,
wherever they might be, to inhibit unconstitutional police

79. Id.
80. See generally id. at 81-82.
81. Id. Judge Cabranes emphasized that the privilege against selfincrimination has always been an absolute “personal trial right of the accused
in any American ‘criminal case.’” Id. at 81.
82. Allen, 864 F.3d at 82.
83. See id. at 85 (“If our Constitution is to prohibit the use in American trials
of confessions coerced or compelled by a foreign sovereign under some
circumstances . . . it cannot be the case that compulsion by a foreign authority
ipso facto ends the constitutional inquiry”) (emphasis in original); see also
Henning, supra note 23.
84. Id. at 81-82.
85. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d
177, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2008) [hereinafter In re Terrorist Bombings] (comparing
the Fourth Amendment’s extraterritorial application to the Fifth Amendment,
and underscoring that the Fifth Amendment guarantees fairness and reliability
to all defendants, regardless of one’s status as a foreigner or an American
citizen).
86. See Allen, 864 F.3d at 81 (emphasizing that regardless of what occurs
before trial, “the right not to testify against oneself at trial is ‘absolute’”)
(emphasis in original).
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practices.87 Contrarily, the Clause applies within the walls of U.S.
courtrooms even in the case of foreign government compulsion, so
long as the manner “does not shock the conscience or violate
fundamental fairness.”88 As such, even when a foreign sovereign
forces an individual to speak under the grant of immunity, the
individual cannot be brought to the U.S. and materially tried on the
basis of those compelled disclosures. 89
Allen’s discussion of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments’
distinct constitutional purposes guided the court toward its
affirmation that the Clause is undoubtedly applicable in criminal
proceedings that have transnational roots, but that are ultimately
tried within U.S. borders.90 Admittedly, making such a substantial
proclamation may be overly simplistic when applied to future crossborder cases that present different factual scenarios than those in
Allen.91 Either way, the Second Circuit has banned government use
of statements compelled by a foreign sovereign to incriminate an
individual.92 The next section analyzes the arguments presented on
appeal and weighs those contentions against other relevant Fifth
Amendment inquiries.

III. ANALYSIS
Allen sternly warns U.S. prosecutors that the risks involved
with conducting cross-border investigations fall heavily on
prosecutors themselves, not on American courts, and not on foreign
corporate targets the DOJ seeks to prosecute. 93 Consequently, the
Second Circuit will likely remain unsympathetic toward the use of
87. Id.
88. Id. at 82.
89. Id. (“[i]n short, compelled testimony cannot be used to secure a
conviction in an American court. This is so even when the testimony was
compelled by a foreign government in full accordance with its own law”).
90. See id. at 81 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule
was created to deter police from using unconstitutional investigatory
techniques to incriminate individuals, which ultimately has little “deterrent
effect upon foreign police officers”); see also id. at 82 (distinguishing the SelfIncrimination Clause, which focuses on what occurs inside the courtroom, from
the exclusionary rule, which focuses on unconstitutional events occurring
outside of the courtroom. Ultimately, the Second Circuit underscored certain
distinctions between the Fourth and Fifth Amendment to substantiate why the
latter applies to involuntary statements procured by foreign sovereigns).
91. This Comment primarily focuses on Allen as an issue of first impression,
and examines how issues of taint could be circumvented should courts follow
the Second Circuit’s ruling. For a critique of Allen and a comparison of the case
to precedent along with suggestions for alternative holdings, see Jennifer Reich,
A New Hurdle to International Cooperation in Criminal Investigations: Whether
Foreign Government-Compelled Testimony Implicates the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 789 (2018).
92. Allen, 864 F.3d at 82, 101.
93. Id. at 88 (reaffirming that it is the prosecution’s job to proffer evidence
that is within the confines of the Constitution).
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contaminated evidence to convict individuals, 94 despite the court’s
acknowledgment that it is exceptionally hard to comply with foreign
law when investigating corporate crime across our borders.95 Either
way, prosecutors must learn how to calculate the constitutional
consequences of conducting cross-border investigations.96 To do
this, it is imperative to understand just what went wrong with the
DOJ’s case-in-chief both in the eyes of the Second Circuit and in
sister circuits which choose to adopt similar standards of review of
foreign-compelled testimony issues.

A. Deconstructing the Arguments on Appeal
The DOJ presented a threshold argument on appeal, asserting
that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated unless both the party
compelling the defendant to speak and the party using the
compelled testimony are dually bound by the Fifth Amendment.97
Further, the DOJ definitively argued that Robson’s testimony
remained untainted, regardless of any exposure to Allen and Conti’s
immunized statements.98 In the alternative, the DOJ argued that
any Fifth Amendment violation was harmless, pleading that the
same verdict would have been reached even without the use of
Robson’s allegedly tainted testimony.99 This section analyzes the
same-sovereign argument and the DOJ’s contention regarding the
admissibility of Robson’s testimony.
The DOJ argued that the FCA’s interviews of Allen and Conti
did not warrant Fifth Amendment protection in the U.S. because
the use of incriminating testimony the Clause forbids is limited, and
therefore, does not protect defendants whose speech is compelled by

94. See Jody Godoy, 2nd Cir. Won’t Revisit Use of Forced Testimony, LAW360
(Nov. 9, 2017, 3:58 PM), www.law360.com/articles/980118/2nd-circ-won-trevisit-use-of-forced-testimony (mentioning that the Second Circuit refused to
reconsider Allen, forcing the Government to appeal to the Supreme Court or
succumb to the newly imposed limitations on cross-border cases).
95. See generally Allen, 864 F.3d at 87-90 (touching on the consequences of
Allen’s holding).
96. See Bruce M. Bettigole et al., United States v. Allen and the Taint of
Compelled Testimony in Cross-Border Enforcement Actions, EVERSHEDS
SUTHERLAND (July 25, 2017), us.eversheds-sutherland.com/NewsCommentary/
Legal-Alerts/202026/Legal-Alert-United-States-v-Allen-and-the-Taint-ofCompelled-Testimony-in-Cross-Border-Enforcement-Actions (justifying the
need for increased cooperation and coordination in cross-border cases at earlier
stages of an investigation).
97. See Brief for the United States-Appellee at 117, United States v. Allen,
864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-898) [hereinafter Brief for the United States]
(arguing that “a violation of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against
compelled self-incrimination requires compulsion by a sovereign bound by the
Self-Incrimination Clause, namely a state government of the United States or
the federal government”).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 25, 140-41.
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a foreign sovereign.100 The DOJ further asserted that statements
received by foreign governments via grants of immunity are not per
say “compelled” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 101
Under certain circumstances, the assertion that the Fifth
Amendment is not absolute holds valid weight. For example, the
privilege may not be invoked when a defendant does not reasonably
fear his statements will be used to incriminate him. 102 As applied
here, however, this reasoning proscribes too narrow of a reading
and interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause.103
Allen properly reaffirmed that what matters for Fifth
Amendment purposes is the point at which the constitutional abuse
occurs,104 and of course, whether the immunized testimony was
materially used to establish a criminal conviction.105 The right
against self-incrimination is violated as soon as compelled
statements are used against a defendant in a criminal proceeding;
not when the defendant’s speech is involuntarily elicited.106
Accordingly, timing of compulsion (as the timing relates to the
subsequent use and scope of immunized testimony) must carry
greater analytical weight than source of compulsion. The latter
serves as one factor to be considered in the constitutional inquiry,
but nonetheless, holds little if any weight.
One of the Fifth Amendment’s most important goals aims at
limiting the prosecution’s use of certain investigative tactics to
incriminate an individual in America. 107 As applied to cross-border
cases, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the prosecution from using
foreign-compelled statements to secure convictions by way of a
witness’s tainted words, as opposed to independently collected

100. Id. at 118 (citing Balsys, 524 U.S. at 669, 672-74).
101. See id. at 119 (arguing that the predicates needed to implicate the Fifth
Amendment namely, compulsion and use of compelled testimony, were absent
in Allen because the FCA is not bound by the Fifth Amendment).
102. See Gregory O. Tuttle, “Cooperative Prosecution” and the Fifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1346, 135152 (2010) (indicating, properly, that the Self-Incrimination Clause does not offer
defendants an unconditional privilege).
103. See, e.g., Allen, 864 F.3d at 85 (emphasizing that when “foreign
authorities compel testimony they are acting in the quintessence of their
sovereign authority, not in their capacity as a mere employer . . . thus their
compulsion is cognizable by the Fifth Amendment”).
104. Id. at 81.
105. See id. at 86 (inferring that the constitutional violation protects against
the actual use of coerced statements, which supports why the same-sovereign
principle has little if any force here).
106. See Brief for Defendants at 101 (citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.
760, 767 (2003); In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 188; United States v.
North, 920 F.2d 940, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990) [hereinafter North II] (“[t]he
presentation—‘use’—of the testimony is precisely the proscribed act”)).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1456 (11th Cir. 1997)
(discussing the Fifth Amendment’s common law aim at protecting against
inquisitional government techniques).
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testimony.108 Accordingly, “[w]hether the government’s use of
compelled testimony occurs in the natural course of events or
results from an unprecedented aberration is irrelevant to a citizen’s
Fifth Amendment right.”109 The same-sovereign principle overlooks
the ideation that it is not so much who is doing the compelling, but
rather whether the compelled testimony is illicitly used to obtain
the conviction.110
In what Allen subsequently recanted as “[t]he less
straightforward question” was the DOJ’s alternative argument,
which asserted that regardless of any Fifth Amendment violation,
Robson’s review of Defendants’ compelled statements had no
material effect on the information Robson provided the DOJ, or the
testimony that he offered at trial.111 To bolster this contention, the
DOJ highlighted the measures it took to keep its investigation
separate from the FCA.112 The DOJ was of a strong belief that the
investigatory wall it had built prevented any contamination of the
evidence proffered.113 In fact, the DOJ did take significant
protective steps in the hopes of veering off the path toward taint,
including discussing with the FCA the crucial need to isolate the
evidence and obtaining completely different attorneys to assess the
FCA depositions.114 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals was unconvinced.
The Second Circuit underscored that the prosecution’s
consequential Kastigar burden is not simply overcome when the
prosecutor offers portions of testimony that it claims are distinct

108. Berger & Florence, supra note 63 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument
at 18:9-19, United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-898-cr);
see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 31:9-11, United States v. Allen, 864
F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-898-cr) (arguing further that “[i]t’s not a question
of whether . . . the Justice Department is to blame for this testimony. The issue
is are they using it”).
109. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
withdrawn & superseded in part on reh’g, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
[hereinafter North I] (“[T]he very purpose of the Fifth Amendment under these
circumstances is to prevent the prosecutor from transmogrifying into the
inquisitor, complete with that officer’s most pernicious tool–the power of the
state to force a person to incriminate himself”).
110. See Allen, 864 F.3d at 86 (reasserting that the right against selfincrimination is a personal right invoked at trial, which is violated “at the time
of use”. Notably, Allen abandoned distinctions between statements deemed
“involuntary” versus statements considered “compelled,” holding that the
Clause protects against the use of compelled statements, regardless of
semantics. Id. at 82.).
111. Allen, 864 F.3d at 92; see also Brief for the United States, supra note
97, at 25, 140-41.
112. See, e.g., Allen, 864 F.3d at 76 (this included a one and two-day
procedure where the DOJ conducted its witness interviews before the FCA).
113. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 97, at 110.
114. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based
on Kastigar at 2 n.1, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR).
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from a defendant’s compelled testimony; neither is that heavy
burden overcome when a district court incorrectly lowers Kastigar’s
bar by merely accepting the prosecution’s counterargument at face
value.115 In application, the privilege applies to immunized
testimony under 18 U.S.C. § 6002, 116 which seeks to insulate the
right against self-incrimination by barring the prosecution “from
using . . . compelled testimony in any respect”—be it directly or
indirectly.117 The use of previously compelled testimony under the
“wholly independent” standard is also barred when the witness’s
memory of events is refreshed by a defendant’s compelled
testimony.118 Moreover, testimony offered by a witness that is
“shaped, altered, or affected” by exposure to compelled testimony
must be excluded from evidence.119 Some courts have invoked
stricter standards than others. The D.C. Circuit, for example, is
uninterested in considering the prosecution’s knowledge regarding
whether a defendant’s testimony was previously immunized, and is
instead solely concerned with whether such testimony was used. 120
All courts reviewing testimony for a possibility of taint should,
however, analyze the likelihood that exposure to a defendant’s
foreign-immunized statements materially influenced the kind of
evidence the witness provides the prosecution.121
In hindsight, the DOJ would have had to prepare for the
Kastigar hearing quite differently considering the scrutiny its
evidence received at the appellate level. When assessing these
inquiries moving forward, it is important for white collar criminal
prosecutors to note that even when witnesses offer a detailed
remuneration of events from what the witness perceives to be their
personal knowledge, this does not exclude the possibility that the
witness’s memory was neither refreshed nor influenced by
immunized statements.122 Prosecutors must be prepared to refute

115. Allen, 864 F.3d at 93, 97.
116. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
117. U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 656 (1992) (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453) (emphasis in original).
118. See North I, 910 F.2d at 856 (qualifying “the use of immunized
testimony by witnesses to refresh their memories, or otherwise . . . focus their
thoughts, organize their testimony, or alter their prior or contemporaneous
statements” as evidentiary use. Impermissible use also encompasses witnesses
who have reviewed or studied previously immunized testimony in preparation
for trial. Id. Note that Allen did not decide this specific evidentiary issue, but
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the D.C. Circuit that at the
very least, “the Government is required to prove that [the trial witness’s]
exposure to the compelled testimony did not shape, alter, or affect the
information . . . provided and that the Government used.” Id. at 93).
119. Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 373 (quoting North I, 910 F.2d at 863).
120. North I, 910 F.2d at 859 (“The prosecution’s knowledge (or lack thereof)
that the testimony was immunized is relevant to the question of prosecutorial
good faith, not prosecutorial use”) (emphasis added).
121. See, e.g., id. at 861.
122. Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 374 (“That a witness proffers a more detailed
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defense assertions which argue that refreshing a witness’s
recollection of events at trial led to tainted evidence. This requires
a rather persuasive prosecutorial showing that evidence was
independently derived and separately maintained, especially when
a witness’s personal recollection shows material correlation to
immunized statements.123
Prosecutors must undeniably focus on the Second Circuit Court
of Appeal’s dissatisfaction with the district court’s loose standard of
review of the Kastigar issues. The appellate court was noticeably
disappointed that the lower court had passively accepted Robson’s
assertion that his testimony remained uncontaminated as doing so
unacceptably lowered the requirements under Kastigar.124
Specifically, the DOJ’s use of charts attempting to show distinctions
between Robson and Defendants’ testimony could not by itself be
enough to overcome Kastigar concerns.125 As previously stated by
the D.C. circuit, when “a substantially exposed witness does not
persuasively claim that he can segregate the effects of his exposure,
the prosecution does not meet its burden merely by pointing to other
statements of the same witness that were not themselves shown to
be untainted.”126 As such, “bare, self-serving” and “conclusory
denials” cannot carry the prosecution’s weight when a witness’s
post-exposure testimony reveals substantial parallelism to a
defendant’s foreign-compelled testimony.127
In practice, the trial judge remains responsible for effectively
pulling apart pieces of a witness’s memory from the defendant’s
immunized statements; it is the prosecution’s responsibility to show
that by doing so, the trial judge will find no Fifth Amendment
issues.128 Prosecutors must be abundantly cautious when rebutting
tainted testimony issues before, during, and after Kastigar
hearings. As illustrated, relying on a witness’s assertion that his
testimony was unaffected by his review of compelled testimony is
insufficient to defeat a defendant’s Fifth Amendment constitutional
safeguard.129 A truly persuasive showing to the court of
independently derived evidence is necessary to save the case.
In the end, Allen reminds judges and white collar criminal
counsel that they must scrutinize the effect foreign-compelled
account than, or a rebuttal of, the defendant’s immunized testimony may
demonstrate ‘personal knowledge’ in the evidentiary sense; but it simply does
not rule out the possibility that the witness’s memory was refreshed or
influenced by the immunized testimony”).
123. See, e.g., id. at 375.
124. Allen, 864 F.3d at 93.
125. Id. at 94, 96.
126. Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 376.
127. Allen, 864 F.3d at 94.
128. See generally Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 390 (Mikva, J., dissenting in part)
(explaining the need for the trier of fact to determine presence or absence of
taint after a full Kastigar hearing).
129. See Allen, 864 F.3d at 96, 101.
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testimony could have on a defendant’s fate. Prosecutors must accept
that, “[t]he stern language of Kastigar does not become lenient
because the compelled testimony is used to form and alter evidence
in oblique ways exclusively, or at a slight distance from the chair of
the immunized witness.”130 Judicial review of foreign-compelled
testimony by appellate courts will undoubtedly continue to be a
crucial step for prosecutors to overcome.131

B. Assessing the Fear of Allen as Precedent
Looking prospectively, avoiding a future circuit split on
foreign-compelled testimony issues would certainly help to avoid
complicating the already complex cross-border investigation
process.132 However, any divergence in opinion would need to be
based on more than just the fear that Allen, as precedent, will
further complicate the cross-border incrimination process. The DOJ
transparently expressed a fear that the Second Circuit’s
unwillingness to find merit in its arguments could considerably
complicate future prosecutions of individuals like Allen and Conti.
The DOJ was especially frightful of a scenario where a “hostile
government bent on frustrating prosecution . . . would . . . compel a
witness to testify and then publicize the . . . testimony, unilaterally
putting the United States to its heavy Kastigar burden.”133 The
Government’s desire to limit protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment privilege are essentially based on a worry that a
broader reading of the Clause would undermine the feasibility of
trying future cross-border cases. Judge Cabranes remained
unmoved by these concerns, indicating that the prosecution has
always been required to work collaboratively with foreign
counterparts.134 In any event, this fear alone cannot override a
130. See also North I, 910 F.2d at 860 (highlighting “[t]he fact that the
government violates the Fifth Amendment in a circuitous or haphazard fashion
is cold comfort to the citizen who has been forced to incriminate himself by
threat of imprisonment for contempt”).
131. See, e.g., Jocelyn Strauber et al., United States v. Allen and Its Check
on Compelled Testimony in Cross-Border Investigations, BLOOMBERG BNA
CRIM. L. REP. (Oct. 11, 2017) (identifying the procedural safeguards defendants
will continue to receive post-Allen).
132. See West et al., supra note 48 (offering the following commentary:
“[s]hould the Ninth Circuit (or others) separate from the Second Circuit on this
issue, the resulting circuit split and uncertainty will only compound these
challenges”).
133. Brief for the United States, supra note 97, at 123 (expressing concern
over hostile foreign governments destroying U.S. cases). Interestingly, a similar
concern was raised by the dissent in North II. See North II, 920 F.2d at 945
(explaining the apparent fear that a hostile witness could purposefully expose
“himself to . . . immunized [statements] in order to destroy the value of his
testimony”).
134. See id. at 87 (asserting that “we live in a world of nation-states in which
our Government must be able to function effectively in the company of sovereign
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defendant’s fundamental right against self-incrimination.135
The D.C. Circuit has stated somewhat similarly that while
“[t]here is great temptation . . . to focus on the institutional interests
at stake . . . that is the wrong angle from which to view the . . .
arguments.”136 However, in pushing the DOJ’s fears aside, Allen left
open the very real possibility that a foreign government could
purposefully sabotage prosecutorial efforts in the U.S. 137 Allen also
stopped short of addressing just how hard it is to investigate white
collar crime when foreign authorities contemporaneously
investigate the same suspects as U.S. authorities. Surely, the DOJ’s
angst that Allen will hamper cross-border investigations is valid
considering the Second Circuit’s holding puts an even heavier
burden on prosecutors trying international white collar crime, and
lessens the burden on attorneys defending them.138 Not to mention,
prosecutors face the added burden of anticipating which countries
foreign witnesses are situated in,139 which can put prosecutorial
agents in the uncomfortable position of guessing which countries’
laws they will need to comport with.140 The other damaging
prosecutorial realities are that, for one, it is not always easy to
establish mutual collaboration with foreign authorities.141
Additionally, some defendants may receive automatic protection
from use of their forced statements even when foreign-compelled
testimony is not saturated with the kind of taint that Kastigar
bars.142
nations.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. See, e.g., id. at 89 n.111 (citing Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,
428 (1956) (“Having had much experience with a tendency in human nature to
abuse power, the Founders sought to close the doors against like future abuses
by law-enforcing agencies.”)).
136. North I, 910 F.2d at 959.
137. See Allen, 864 F.3d at 88 (indicating that “[t]his case raises no questions
regarding the legitimacy or regularity of the procedures employed by the U.K.
government or the U.K. government’s investigation more generally,” and that
Allen “would not necessarily prevent prosecution in the United States” in an
instance where foreign governments hypothetically sabotage U.S. prosecutions
by immunizing a suspect and then publicizing the suspect’s testimony.
However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals left it at that, choosing to
withhold an explanation of what the court would do in such a situation).
138. Brief for the United States, supra note 97, at 123.
139. Strauber et al., supra note 131.
140. See, e.g., id. (stating that “it may be difficult to determine in which
jurisdiction a target should be prosecuted in the early stages of an investigation,
before all relevant evidence has been developed and before it is clear which
targets ultimately may . . . be available as witnesses”).
141. See id. (explaining the challenges complicated by decisions like Allen
and highlighting the need to work more collaboratively with foreign
governments).
142. See generally Neal Modi, Toward an International Right Against SelfIncrimination Expanding the Fifth Amendment’s “Compelled” to Foreign
Compulsion, 103 VA. L. REV. 961, 1012 (2017) (evaluating Allen as a decision
that overlooks the meaning of Kastigar, asserting that “[t]he heavy burden that
use and derivative use immunity represents, once applied between countries
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Moreover, as the DOJ points out, even when a foreign
authority such as the FCA collaborates with U.S. prosecutors,
foreign governments could still choose to put their investigatory
goals above the DOJ’s.143 Foreign jurisdictions could purposefully
sabotage U.S. cases by leaking compelled testimony to prevent any
success prosecutors would have at Kastigar hearings, just as the
DOJ fears.144 The list of fears prosecutorial agents have may only
grow as corporate crime becomes more complex and as future
circuits adopt Allen’s ruling. In light of these concerns, the next
section proposes proactive approaches to take when navigating
foreign-compelled testimony issues.

IV. PROPOSAL
The constitutional consequences that unraveled in Allen
underscore the reality that use of tainted evidence, however slight,
can be fatal to the prosecution’s case. Prosecutors must always
remember that they “[bear] the continuous and uninterrupted
burden of persuasion.”145 Keeping this theme at the forefront of a
litigation strategy is crucial in the cross-border context where
factual circumstances are especially complex. While some courts
have alluded to the ways in which prosecutors can avoid
unconstitutional use issues, others have given explicit instructions
and not within the same country, may translate, in effect, to full transactional
immunity for foreign-compelled targets.” Meaning that foreign defendants may
receive full transactional immunity when Kastigar requires something less
than that).
143. See Strauber et al., supra note 131 (assessing the challenges posed
when investigatory authorities try to secure international cooperation, and
stressing the fact that “[e]ven with such a commitment” to international
cooperation “a foreign authority may be reluctant to forgo such techniques,
potentially losing valuable evidence should a U.S. prosecution ultimately not be
unviable, or should a foreign authority conclude that its own interests in
prosecution outweigh” those of the U.S.).
144. See Allen, 864 F.3d at 87 (relaying the Government’s fear that Allen
could lead to intentional destruction of American prosecutorial efforts by foreign
governments. The Second Circuit was ultimately unpersuaded by this concern,
explaining that the Fifth Amendment right trumps any complications
prosecutors have when securing witnesses and gathering incriminating
evidence); see also Anthony Capozzolo, Recent Public Disclosure of Sealed U.K.
Testimony by DOJ Highlights Big Risks in Multi-Jurisdiction Prosecutions,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 4, 2017, 10:03 AM), news.bloomberglaw.com/whitecollar-and-criminal-law/recent-public-disclosure-of-sealed-uk-testimony-bydoj-highlights-big-risks-in-multi-jurisdiction-prosecutions (emphasizing that
“[o]ne can only imagine how less savory individuals in foreign jurisdictions
might be willing to leak the press copies of compelled testimony to try to throw
a wrench into a U.S. criminal prosecution. Such a leak, done early enough in
the investigation, might be enough to make winning a Kastigar Hearing
untenable, rendering a prosecution impossible.” This demonstrates the kinds of
costly consequences Allen could have on future parallel investigations and
domestic criminal proceedings).
145. North II, 920 F.2d at 954.
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on how to avoid taint. This proposal pulls relevant suggestions from
precedent and federal grand jury practice guides, and incorporates
them into a framework for avoiding foreign-compelled testimony
issues. Ultimately, these points are aimed at guiding prosecutors
toward a successful approach. However, defense attorneys should
also take these into consideration when determining which SelfIncrimination and Kastigar claims to pursue.146

A. Phase I: Avoiding the Foreign-Compelled Testimony
Trap During the Investigation and Discovery Stages
Perhaps the most reassuring investigatory technique that
prosecutors can use to avoid foreign-compelled testimony claims is
to “can” testimony whenever feasible. It is rather telling that this
investigatory technique was advocated in North II—a case that
concerns relevant evidentiary issues in the cross-border context.147
Canning testimony allows prosecutors to show courts that any
evidence proffered was insulated from foreign-compelled
statements.148 Prosecutors should take serious measures to
prerecord witness statements, and the earlier in the cross-border
probe prosecutors can do this, the better. Ultimately, canning
testimony will only help to bolster a prosecutor’s claim that
investigatory leads were not drawn from compelled statements. 149
Another investigatory tactic that has been advocated is to draft
memoranda including the evidence the prosecution has obtained,
and to do so prior to the time an individual testifies under
immunity.150 Prosecutors should take this approach in the crossborder context, but do so at a much more detailed level. This
requires drafting evidentiary source memoranda both in real-time
as U.S. authorities conduct investigations abroad, and thereafter as
146. The following points are organized in accordance with when in the
prosecutorial timeline they should be implemented. As a general matter, these
suggestions are intended to focus on both the grand jury proceeding and the
trial witness as Second Circuit precedent specifically requires that indictments
procured by taint be dismissed. See Allen, 864 F.3d at 98 (referencing U.S. v.
Nanni, 59 F.3d 1425, 1443 (2d Cir. 1995), U.S. v. Tantalo, 680 F.2d 903, 908-09
(2d Cir. 1982), and U.S. v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. Carter v. U.S., 429 U.S. 980 (1976)). Thus, where reference is made to trial
witnesses, such reference shall also include grand jury witnesses.
147. See North II, 920 F.2d at 943.
148. Charles Tiefer, Concurrent Congressional and Criminal Investigations:
Lessons from History at 5, www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-1117%20Tiefer%20Testimony.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (explaining “the
‘canning’ process” as one “by which testimony and evidence [is] put away ‘in the
can’ prior to immunity, for prosecutors to show they had known of . . . evidence
before the grant of use immunity”).
149. See, e.g., id. at 942.
150. Susan W. Brenner & Lori E. Shaw, Federal Grand Jury: A Guide to
Law and Practice, 1 Fed. Grand Jury § 12:17 (2d ed.) at 1 [hereinafter Brenner
& Shaw § 12:17].
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the prosecution obtains additional evidence throughout the
discovery stage. Prosecutors should keep track of the date, time, and
source of the evidence, including any compelled evidence obtained
by a foreign sovereign that the prosecution later learns of. These
detailed track records can be employed later in the litigation stage
to show U.S. courts considering Kastigar issues that any evidence
collected while the defendant was under review by a foreign
authority was legitimately, independently derived.
As the investigation develops, prosecutors must uncover what
facts a cooperating witness claims to know, and more importantly
remember, before any possible exposure to foreign-compelled
testimony. The prosecution should always require the witness to
write their pre-exposure testimony down. Memorialization of
witness statements is just as important as the prosecution’s
memorialization of their evidentiary sources. Keeping independent
records of testimony and a detailed remuneration of where, when,
and how evidence was obtained will allow the prosecution to
implement their own causal analysis to determine whether their
evidence is sufficiently independent before insinuations of Fifth
Amendment violations occur. By linking each piece of evidence to a
time, place, and source, prosecutors can break the causal chain of
evidentiary events that lead to unconstitutional use claims later
down the prosecutorial pipeline.151
As the prosecution leaves the investigation and discovery
phases and enters the pre-trial stage, it will become more and more
essential to review the content of the witness’s statements, and
compare those to the defendant’s foreign-compelled testimony.
When a witness offers the prosecution new testimonial evidence,
prosecutors should reinstitute this kind of comparison analysis to
ensure that any evidentiary crosshairs remain legitimately
independent of the defendant’s compelled disclosures. This will
serve as a prosecutorial checklist to ensure that the evidence does
not contain unconstitutional fruits barred by Kastigar. The same
kind of analysis should be implemented throughout trial and before
Kastigar hearings.

B. Phase II: Tactics for the Pre-Trial Through Trial
Stages
The closer the prosecution gets to grand jury proceedings and
trial, the greater the need to decide whether to use evidence
obtained from a witness, or nix it entirely. At this point, if the
witness has been exposed, even slightly, to previously immunized
testimony, it is necessary for prosecutors to reassess the reliability
of a witness’s memory. This should involve discerning whether the
151. See, e.g., North II, 920 F.2d at 946-47 (providing support for a casual
analysis of taint).
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witness can separate his memory from statements compelled by a
foreign sovereign.152 To effectively do that, prosecutors should
require the witness to pull apart factual pieces that the witness
claims to come from personal experience, thoughts, actions, and
encounters with the defendant. Prosecutors should then assess
whether material portions of the witness’s statements correlate to
foreign-compelled testimony. Prosecutors should only use witnesses
that are affirmatively willing to testify under oath that the
witness’s recollection does not materially borrow from any review,
whether directly or indirectly, of statements immunized abroad.
Prosecutors specifically need to consult their witnesses for purposes
of gauging how confident the witness is that his or her memory was
not colored by any exposure to involuntary statements procured by
a foreign government. Doing so will allow prosecutors to change
evidentiary paths should witness stories collapse or otherwise show
too substantial of an overlap.

C. Phase III: Dodging Taint at Trial and Appeal
Prosecutors should ensure that they are prepared to overcome
two significant hurdles during the trial and appeal stage. First,
before trial and Kastigar hearings, prosecutors must ensure that
the evidence it plans to use will survive a line-item review of the
evidence for Fifth Amendment and Kastigar issues. United States
v. Slough153 offers insight into what a lower court must do when
examining the evidence for taint. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit does
not allow the evidence to be treated “as single lumps” and disallows
the exclusion of evidence “in [its] entirety [if] at . . . most only some
portion of the content was tainted”. 154
To determine overlap of compelled testimony, Slough indicates
that a district court must sift through evidence line-by-line.155 The
152. See Allen, 864 F.3d at 97 (illustrating one prosecutorial mistake the
Second Circuit picked up on was Robson’s repeated claims that he could not
recall much, which “[established] that he lacked the ability ‘to separate the
wheat of [his] unspoiled memory from the chaff of [Defendants’] immunized
testimony”).
153. 641 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Slough concerned several defendants
who provided sworn written statements to the Department of State’s Diplomatic
Security Service after a car bomb exploded near a Baghdad compound. Id. at
547-48. The defendants were guaranteed that any evidence derived from their
statements would not be used against them in a criminal case. Id. at 548. Very
early after the incident occurred, news reports were published; those reports
relied on an incident report by the State Department, which had in turn,
purportedly relied on the sworn witness statements and interviews. Id. The
government’s most-relied-upon witnesses later conceded that they had seen and
reviewed those news reports. Id. at 549.
154. Id. at 550.
155. See Wayne R. LaFave et al., 3 Crim. Proc. § 8.11(c) (4th ed.) (2018) at 7
n.51 (citing Slough, 641 F.3d at 551 “Where two independent sources of
evidence, one tainted and one not, are possible antecedents of particular
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line-item approach helps determine whether the evidentiary
sources proffered are sufficiently independent, and thus, free of
taint. On the flipside, as seen in Allen, prosecutors should
understand that if a court decides not to scrutinize their evidence
piece by piece, and subsequently determines that no taint exists, it
is likely that the prosecution’s evidence will be put through a much
stricter review by an appellate court. During this process, the
prosecution must always be able to point to material pieces of
evidence that were independently derived. In so doing, the
prosecution can effectively argue that any error in the way that the
district court evaluated the evidence was harmless.
Second, prosecutors must avoid offering the court what Allen
deems “generalized” and “self-serving” denials of taint.156 The
judiciary’s questioning will involve prying into the witness’s
mind.157 During this process, prosecutors should refrain from
merely feeding the witness what the court wants to hear, or putting
a witness on the stand that can only offer short, conclusory answers
to the court’s long and legitimate line of questioning.158
Avoiding merely conclusory answers will require prosecutors
to think outside of the box before reaching the trial stage. For
example, prosecutors will need to dig deeper when foreigncompelled testimony is involved to uncover: (i) the nature in which
the witness was exposed to the defendant’s immunized statements;
(ii) the way in which the prosecution’s witness reviewed said
testimony; and (iii) the motivation behind the witness’s
corroboration. The witness’s motivation is especially significant.
Defense attorneys are sure to assert impermissible use claims
under Kastigar when a witness’s motive in cooperating is the mere
result of the witness’s review of (and inspiration by) immunized
testimony.159 Inevitably, prosecutors will be in a better position
when they can point to facts that establish the “why” answers and
explanations regarding how the evidence proffered was derived at a
legitimate distance from foreign-compelled statements, or has not
otherwise been shaped or altered by review of compelled testimony.
Hypothetically, a witness that was only tangentially exposed to

testimony, the tainted source’s presence doesn’t ipso facto establish taint.”). The
Second Circuit highlighted in both United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 689
(2d Cir. 1990) and United States v. Nanni, 59 F.3d 1425, 1432 (2d Cir. 1995)
that the court must determine whether the government’s motivating factor for
securing a conviction would have been the same had the “motivating effect of
the immunized testimony” been taken out of the picture. See also Slough, 641
F.3d at 552 (“To preserve . . . symmetry [of that net effect], obviously courts
cannot bar the government from use of evidence that it would have obtained in
the absence of the immunized statement”).
156. Allen, 864 F.3d at 94, 96, 101.
157. See, e.g., id. at 94 (evaluating Robson’s memory and state of mind).
158. See id. at 101.
159. North II, 920 F.2d at 942 (citing United States v. Rinaldi, 808 F.2d
1579, 1584 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
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foreign-compelled testimony, and whose reason for cooperating are
genuine in that they seek to tell the truth (as opposed to finding
answers to unknown questions, and thus, saving themselves from
adverse judicial consequences) will fare better for prosecutors
during the litigation process.

D. Final Considerations for Escaping Taint
Kastigar itself institutes a blanket ban on the use of compelled
testimony, which was evident when the Supreme Court prohibited
“using . . . compelled testimony in any respect.” 160 However, lower
courts have applied Kastigar differently.161 As such, future courts
may offer a divergence in opinion regarding illicit use of foreigncompelled testimony. Regardless, it is important for prosecutors to
realize that the degree of preparation, and the way in which
arguments should be presented differ depending on whether a
witness directly reviews (therein fatally saturating themselves with
taint), versus when a witness inadvertently becomes exposed to
such testimony.
1. Overcoming the Non-Evidentiary Use Hurdle
Categorically, there are three Kastigar claims that could be
raised. Ranging from the least worrisome for the prosecution to the
most are: direct use claims, indirect use claims, and non-evidentiary
use claims.162 The most complex misuse claims are those involving
non-evidentiary use of a witness’s immunized testimony. 163 The
following may fall within the purview of non-evidentiary use:
“focusing the investigation, deciding to initiate prosecution,
refusing to plea bargain, interpreting evidence, planning crossexamination, and otherwise generally planning trial strategy.” 164 Of
note, not every court agrees that non-evidentiary use is barred by
Kastigar, and to complicate matters further, the courts that do
deem non-evidentiary use impermissible have not explained what
the government must show to overcome such a claim.165
The prosecutors who do find themselves in this situation may
have one persuading assertion to invoke. The right circumstances
in a cross-border case may call for the prosecution to assert the
inevitable discovery doctrine.166 The doctrine is basically one of

160. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
161. Andrew V. Jezic et al., Maryland Law of Confessions, Md. Law of
Confessions § 28:35 (2019 ed.).
162. See Susan W. Brenner & Lori E. Shaw, Federal Grand Jury: A Guide
to Law and Practice, 1 Fed. Grand Jury § 12:16 (2d ed.) at 1.
163. Id.
164. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Id. at 2.
166. See Brenner & Shaw § 12:17, supra note 150, at 2 (enumerating the
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harmless error, proposing that if immunized testimony was used to
find subsequent evidence against the immunized witness, the
prosecution would have found the evidence either way. As the
inevitably discovery doctrine relates to cases that cross U.S.
borders, this assertion may require the prosecutors to show: (i) that
the prosecution’s investigation was distinct from any compelled
investigatory techniques used by foreign sovereigns; and (ii) that
the evidence would have been independently discovered had a
permissible investigation been employed.167 The best proactive
approach to take, however, is to refrain from developing litigation
tactics that are exclusively based on immunized statements
obtained abroad.
2. Final Tactics to Employ: From Understanding a Court’s
Evaluation of Taint to Securing Better Cross-Border
Collaboration
Notably, Allen applied the legal standards instituted in a
string of D.C. Circuit court cases. 168 One of those opinions justifies
that “regardless of how or by whom” a witness is exposed to
compelled disclosures, Kastigar is violated once the prosecution
uses witness testimony that has been shaped by previously
compelled testimony.169 At a fundamental level, what the witness
knows before exposure and what the witness adds to their testimony
thereafter are vital evidentiary facts to uncover.170 Regardless of
which circuit prosecutors find themselves in, prosecutors should be
prepared for a judicial focus on “the content and circumstances” to
which unconstitutional use has allegedly occurred, and understand
that a court will review the evidence for taint regardless of who was
at fault for evidentiary contamination. 171
In final consideration, it is worthy to reframe some of the
evidentiary issues in Allen. To quantify, about 47% (twenty-seven
out of fifty-eight) of the trial topics that Robson discussed included
an antecedent in the testimony provided by Allen, and 31%
(eighteen out of fifty-eight) included an antecedent in the testimony
provided by Conti.172 In the future, prosecutors should calculate the
percentage to which witness testimony includes antecedents to
foreign-compelled testimony. While the number in and of itself may
not reveal much, if anything, a value less than the 47-31% range
two-element test the prosecution must meet for proper assertion of the
inevitable discovery doctrine under Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)).
167. See e.g., Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (otherwise defining the test for the
inevitable discovery doctrine).
168. Allen, 864 F.3d at 92 n.134. These cases include: North I, North II
Poindexter, and Slough.
169. North II, 920 F.2d at 942 (emphasis in original).
170. See id. (discussing this issue in Rinaldi, 808 F.2d at 1583).
171. Id.
172. Allen, 864 F.3d at 94.
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should provide prosecutors with insight regarding overlap. Of
course, there will be some similarities between foreign-compelled
testimony and trial testimony, even if the witness was never
exposed to immunized statements. The reality is that the witness
and defendant were likely working together to collude or within a
close distance from each other—enough to have a recount of events
that show a resemblance. It is worthy for prosecutors to establish
this point at Kastigar hearings as doing so will further rebut
defense arguments of taint.
Furthermore, a significant prosecutorial challenge that Allen
accentuates is the need to institute multijurisdictional cooperation
during each phase of a parallel investigation.173 When foreign
agencies simply refuse to collaborate with American authorities,
prosecuting attorneys will need to take extra precaution to avoid
future Kastigar issues.174 In the context of parallel investigations,
this also means that prosecutors facing noncompliance by foreign
jurisdictions must determine whether convicting a corporate target
located abroad will be successful, and in effect, worthy to pursue.
Similarly, it is imperative for prosecutors to work closely with
counsel and risk management teams at corporations where the
suspect’s criminal activity occurred. Considering internal
investigations at corporations have continued to increase, it is likely
that a suspect who U.S. prosecutors wish to pin down is already
being investigated by the suspect’s employer. 175 As such,
prosecutors should educate foreign corporations about the recently
revised Yate’s Memo, which no longer implements the “all or
nothing approach,” and instead provides cooperation credit to
corporations that “identify individuals who were significantly
involved in or caused the criminal conduct.”176
173. See also Strauber et al., supra note 131 (discussing the difficulties
involved when securing mutual collaboration during early stages of cross-border
investigations).
174. See id. (underscoring the hesitation foreign authorities may have about
communicating with others. Foreign authorities could very well decide that the
investigation is worth more on its own than with other agencies involved).
175. See Nyembo Mwarabu, How to Conduct Cross-Border Investigations
Without Losing It, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 18, 2017),
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e3766562-1f68-483e-af9a42b5e28e27f2 (discussing how attorneys can adjust their investigative
strategies to gain traction with companies’ compliance programs).
176. Quoting Yates Memo Revised – DOJ Steps Back from All-or-Nothing
Approach to Corporate Cooperation Credit, MCGUIREWOODS (Dec. 5, 2018)
www.mcguirewoods.com/client-resources/Alerts/2018/12/yates-memo-reviseddoj-steps-back?p=1 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Office of the
Deputy Att’y Gen., Individual Accountability, U.S. DEP’T OF J.,
www.justice.gov/dag/individual-accountability (referring to then-Deputy
Attorney General Sally Q. Yates’s Memorandum titled, “Individual
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing,” released in late 2015. The overall
goal of the Yate’s Memo is to bring more consistency to internal corporate
investigations. The Memo also aims at incentivizing corporations and their
employees to change future behaviors, reward individuals who assist with
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Finally, prosecutors should strive to use taint teams with the
goal of identifying evidentiary flags its witness’s testimony presents
along the way. After Allen, it is beneficial to implement taint teams
at the start of the investigation through trial - as opposed to waiting
to use them, or only using them, in preparation for Kastigar
hearings. Taint teams must also keep certain timing and
transparency issues in mind. For instance, a corporate target whose
collusive acts occurred at a corporation that has a
multijurisdictional presence will require taint teams to be aware of
the possibility that previously compelled testimony could
inadvertently be shared with employees in other foreign
jurisdictions.177 Such a scenario could lead to a trickle-down effect
of taint that complicates segregating clean from tainted testimony
later down the litigation process. In sum, taint teams must remain
knowledgeable about where and by whom compelled testimony has
traveled.
At the end of the day, prosecutors should remain hesitant
about using witnesses who have been exposed to foreign-compelled
testimony. There is no guarantee that doing so will produce a
positive prosecutorial result. To reemphasize, it was not merely the
use of Robson as a witness that became a central Fifth Amendment
issue in Allen; it was the use of Robson’s testimony, coupled with
the fact that his testimony was materially different and far more
incriminating post-exposure.178 Prosecutors must exclude this kind
of toxic testimonial evidence. Undoubtedly, courts following Allen
will be on the lookout for prosecutors whose sole reason for
convicting a cross-border suspect is motivated by the words its
cooperating witness offers.

V.

CONCLUSION

As expressed in Allen, it will be hard to predict “exactly what
this brave new world of international enforcement will entail,” but
all circuit courts should agree that “these developments abroad
need not affect the fairness of our trials at home.” 179 Post-Allen,
prosecuting attorneys should consider enlightening foreign
agencies about the consequences of the Second Circuit’s ruling, and
the corresponding Fifth Amendment privilege afforded to
corporate investigations, and deter future corporate misconduct).
177. See Berger & Grishkan, supra note 45 (substantiating that
“[c]orporations should . . . keep careful watch over any compelled testimony they
may receive by way of disclosure in any jurisdiction in which they operate”).
178. See Henning, supra note 23 (explaining that after Robson read
Defendants’ compelled testimony, he “changed the description of the roles of
[Defendants] in setting Libor to reflect what [Defendants] said”). A similar issue
occurred in North II, where a central witness provided a modified version of the
events at trial after being exposed to immunized statements. See North II, 920
F.2d at 944.
179. Allen, 864 F.3d at 90.
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defendants in American criminal proceedings.180 Regardless of what
kind of scenario prosecutors find themselves in, the probability of
dodging the judiciary’s analysis of taint altogether is high. If
prosecutors play the right cards, that is. Prosecutors should
consider incorporating the suggestions discussed herein as a
proactive approach to avoiding future foreign-compelled testimony
issues.
Whether it be rigging interest rates or undermining freemarket competition, it “is corruption at the molecular level of the
economy, Space Age stealing – and it’s only just coming into
view.”181 Prosecutors can no longer allow the collaboration of
corporate criminals to be more deceitfully successful than the
collaboration among U.S. prosecutors and foreign counterparts. Nor
can future prosecutors afford to fight corporate crime with a blind
eye toward the Constitution. Prosecutors must learn how to
overcome the constitutional consequences of litigating cross-border
corporate crime or allow corporate colluders to walk away free—
with the rest of the world’s rightfully earned profits.

180. See Berger & Grishkan, supra note 45 (offering additional ways to keep
testimonial evidence free of contamination).
181. Taibbi, supra note 1.
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